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The analytic session has lapsed into silence. I am lost in my own thoughts for a few 
moments. When I turn back I find my client is writhing, as if in agony, on the couch. The 
muscles in her legs are clenched and contorted, her breathing rapid. I notice her eyes are 
frightened and glazed as she turns her head from side to side. By now, three years into 
the analysis I recognize the signs. She is caught in a flash back, reliving a terrifying 
experience from an appalling childhood. 
 
I wonder whether to intervene with what has become one of my stock responses.  
‘Are you having a flash back?’ or 
‘Where are you now?’ 
But before I can decide what to say she starts to plead in a low voice. 
‘I want you to speak now.’ 
‘To distract you from what’s happening in the flash back?’ 
She turns, catches my eye for an instant, (I sit beside her) and holds me with a despairing 
smile. 
‘I’m afraid I’ll get lost in it.’ 
I know she’s talking about a fear of madness, of being unable to stop re-living the past 
and return to the here and now of the session. At times she can use the sound of my voice 
to do that. At other times though, it can become woven into the flashback itself. I also 
know from experience if she doesn’t speak about what is happening to her, she is likely 
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to self-harm when she gets home, and try to anaesthetize herself against the nightmares 
that will wake her up by drinking too much. She may also miss sessions or contemplate 
suicide in an attempt to avoid the maelstrom of emotion that has been stirred up. 
‘Try to talk about it’ I say. 
‘There aren’t any words. Just blackness…..’ 
Nevertheless as she starts to speak, haltingly at first, a picture begins to emerge and the 
flash back starts to turn to memory. At first there are likely to be bodily sensations. 
Perhaps the sense of holding herself rocking beneath her cot in the hospital feeling 
abandoned by her parents. Or the smells, which she eventually identifies as her father’s 
sweat and semen mixed with her own blood and shit and then pieces over the coming 
months into a memory of abuse.  
 
The words recounting these experiences act as a thread linking her present to the past, 
herself to me and eventually, it is to be hoped, the fragments of herself together. At times 
however the fear becomes too great, the words cease and a stillness comes over her. She 
has cut the thread and found the imaginary safe place to which she retreated in childhood 
from the terror, the pain and the rage. She lies calm and emotionless while tears stream 
down my face. In her mind she is back in a world of squirrels and rabbits, where people 
are kind- for a while.  
 
Little has changed since Freud’s day. Perhaps today analysts would make more use of the 
transference and countertransference than he did. The flashback to feeling abandoned in 
the hospital might be linked to unmanageable feelings around an impending break; the 
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analyst’s tears to her own uncried ones- and so on.  Certainly tracking the transference 
significance of the flashbacks has been useful in ameliorating the danger of her becoming 
overwhelmed by them. In that sense the transference can act like a homeopathic version 
of the original trauma, a place where unmanageable feelings can be worked through.  But 
despite this shift in emphasis, the essence of the analytic method with a patient like this 
remains remarkably similar to that employed by Freud in the early days of ‘the talking 
cure’ (see Freud 1893-6). It is frightening, time-consuming, hard work for both parties. It 
is nevertheless, potentially at least, immensely rewarding as feelings and experiences, 
which previously expressed themselves only in borderline or somatic symptoms begin to 
become contained and symbolized in words, thoughts, dreams and memories, for the first 
time. 
 
Later on in the same day I am sitting with a patient who has come to see me from time to 
time for homeopathic treatment since the days before I trained to be an analyst. Her first 
son suffered from cerebral palsy shortly after birth. His doctors gave him little chance of 
ever doing much more than sitting up- let alone walking or talking. She attributes the fact 
that he has grown into a fairly normal young man largely to my homeopathic treatment. 
Today she is coming to see me because she is finding it hard to cope with her second, six-
year-old son (by a different man). In the course of our session she remarks that she thinks 
some of her difficulties may be related to the fact that the boy’s father effectively raped 
her two weeks after the birth. 
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I prescribe staphis agria 10M for her, a homeopathic remedy which is so dilute it doesn’t 
chemically exist, and another remedy for her son. It is normal homeopathic practice to 
see members of the same family. A month later she returns saying she is still finding her 
son difficult, though much less of a ‘little demon’. She herself feels more whole and able 
to cope. ‘It is as if the remedy has stitched me up’. Of course she has the past experience 
of my help with her older son to bolster the hope that the remedies I have given will 
work. My feeling though is that her six year old may eventually need psychotherapy (but 
not with me). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the symptomatic relief that she herself 
feels at this early stage is something it may have taken years of analytic work to achieve. 
She appears to feel more emotionally whole after the remedy despite not having really 
talked through the emotional effects of being raped by the boy’s father. I however am left 
with a nagging sense of unease to accompany the gratification of having somehow helped 
her feel better.  
 
That sense of unease contrasts with Edward Whitmont’s apparent confidence in 
homeopathy in his article above. 
 
      When the consequences of serious childhood damage, emotional and physical  
       abuse, rape, incest, war, concentration and prison-camp experiences, drug addiction 
       or other inveterate conditioning have become imprinted somatically, they create  
       stubbornly resistant dissociations and repetition compulsions. In these instances the 
       therapeutic approach stands to benefit from addressing itself also, or perhaps 
       even primarily, to the biologic-psychoid substratum, the ‘subtle’ body fields. 
 
He writes; and leaves us in no doubt that he regards homeopathy as a highly effective 
way of working with those body fields (p. 378 of original). Despite Whitmont’s claims to 
the contrary however, the existence of such body fields remains highly speculative. Nor 
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is there any scientifically acceptable evidence that homeopathy can act physically upon 
them (Linde K. et al 1997). There is therefore a danger of contributing to homeopathy’s 
marginalisation by appealing to energy fields to explain its effects. As I hope to show 
however, there is another way of understanding at least some of its effects, which does 
not rely on the magical or the scientifically unproven. But before going on to consider 
this, I wish to pause to examine Whitmont’s central project in the above article. 
 
Working with analytic impasse 
 
Put at its simplest, that project seems to me to be to propose that analysts consider using 
homeopathy in situations where potentially important analytic material is not 
psychologically accessible. Under these circumstances he suggests that homeopathic 
remedies can help make such material symbolisable and hence available for analysis. 
Without it, conventional analytic methods are, he believes, of only limited value and 
liable to reach an impasse. ‘In order to modify the pathology of the psychoid’, he says, 
‘psychotherapy is in need of complementary modalities of a precognitional [i.e. non-
symbolic] nature’. He goes on to offer two cases to illustrate this point. 
 
The search for ways of overcoming the problem of analytic impasse is of considerable 
therapeutic importance. I will return to consider the viability of Whitmont’s particular 
solution to the problem in the course of this article, when I have laid the groundwork to 
do so more effectively. In the meantime I would like to acknowledge my debt to him for 
pioneering a Jungian approach to homeopathy.  I found this invaluable in my own 
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academic research into the psychology of homeopathy (Withers 1979 a, b), and a source 
of inspiration in my eventual decision to train as an analyst. 
 
My first case above illustrates, however, that conventional analytic methods need not be 
as limited in treating the somatically imprinted effects of serious childhood damage as he 
thinks. Relatively early on in the course of our work together for instance, the chronic 
fatigue, from which my client originally suffered, lifted significantly without recourse to 
any complementary therapy. 
 
Whitmont might reply that not every analytic patient is able to flash back to traumatic 
material so readily. Although this is true, it is worth noting that that did not happen in this 
case until we had moved from once to four times a week analysis. It seems then as 
though the secure holding offered by a full analytic relationship may have been necessary 
for it to occur. It also seems though that Whitmont may have been too categorical in 
dismissing the clinical benefits of the analytic method in such cases. 
 
Understanding homeopathy analytically 
 
If Whitmont too readily dismisses the clinical potential of analysis, he is also I believe at 
times too quick to dismiss its explanatory power. Thus he regards Jung’s attempts to 
understand alchemy in terms of the projection of the contents of the unconscious onto 
matter, as due to the limitations of his ‘ nineteenth-century positivistic medical 
viewpoint.’ (p.374 of original). But I hope to illustrate that a combination of this Jungian 
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formulation with some of Bion’s concepts (Bion 1950), can help illuminate the operation 
of homeopathy- without necessitating the upheaval of contemporary western science. 
 
Whitmont’s first case, it will be recalled, is of a woman in her mid twenties who seems to 
be suffering from severe depression and a borderline condition. The analysis reaches an 
impasse following a limited therapeutic regression and an intellectual understanding of 
the origin of her symptoms, which nevertheless leaves her depressed, lethargic and 
hopeless.  
 
   ‘These feelings centred around her sense of being neglected and held in contempt by  
     her father…’ he writes (p.380). 
 
Rephrasing this we could say she was unable to manage her father’s contempt, and that 
her symptoms stemmed from the toxic effect of internalizing this (Bion 1953). Whitmont 
gave her back an image of that contempt in a safe (detoxified) form- a remedy made of 
potentised puss from the scabies vesicle. She probably knew what substance he was 
giving her. So it is easy to imagine what a powerful emotional effect taking the remedy 
could have had. But even if he had withheld its name, she would still have believed she 
was taking the safe form of a substance that could cause her emotional and physical 
condition by the homeopathic principle. Such a substance would thus constitute an ideal 
container for the projection of the emotions at the heart of her pathology. Once projected 
there she only had to believe in the safety of the remedy she was given, and trust 
Whitmont’s knowledge of homeopathy, in order to take those projections back in a 
symbolically detoxified and therefore therapeutic form. The fact that there was less than a 
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one in a billion chance of encountering even a single molecule of the original puss in the 
remedy is thus irrelevant. On this view its therapeutic effect was due to a psychological 
process of projection, transformation and re-introjection, which only appears magical 
because it was largely unconscious.  
 
This could be considered an example of Bion’s concept of the transformation of beta into 
alpha elements (ibid.). The remedy then would act as a container, via projection, of 
previously uncontained and therefore toxic beta elements. Homeopathic potentisation 
would represent their detoxification into alpha elements. Taking the remedy would 
enable their internalization in that form by the patient (ibid). Symptom relief could then 
follow (see Withers 2001). This formulation could be regarded as the offspring of a 
Jung/Bion marriage, and a variant of Fordham’s theory of deintegration/reintegration (see 
e.g. Fordham 1957).  
 
At the same time as these psychological effects of the remedy, there appear to have been 
parallel deintegrative and reintegrative processes at work in the actual dynamics of the 
transference and countertransference. Once more however, these seem to have been 
largely unconscious and go unremarked by Whitmont. Nevertheless, it is striking how 
like the patient’s all knowing father he must have seemed to her when he made the shift 
from analyst to homeopath. As he himself says, this change involves 
 
           …the partial shift of archetypal role from that of relatively neutral observer and  
            partner in the search to the medical model of director of treatment or all  knowing 




So he both adopted the role of the all-knowing father, and gave her back an image of 
herself (in remedy form) as contemptible. Unlike her real father however Whitmont 
seems to have been able to tolerate the hostility unleashed when he assumed that 
position. The fact that their relationship was able to withstand it was, as he says, probably 
crucial in helping her turn her anger outward into the world rather than inwards into 
depression. But once more, it is not necessary to envisage a physical action of the remedy 
here in order to account for this process. To use a phrase attributed to Plaut (1956) 
Whitmont had  ‘incarnated the archetype’ of the father. And it seems likely that the 
emergence of this emotionally charged theme into their relationship produced a 
significant therapeutic effect. Thus in my view Whitmont has underestimated the 
contribution that analysis can make to understanding the effects of both the remedy, and 
the therapeutic dynamics. 
 
One question that naturally arises at this point is the extent to which homeopathy in 
general can be understood in terms of such psychological mechanisms. Whatever its 
physical effects, it certainly seems likely that psychological factors constitute a far larger 
part of its action than is generally recognized (see Withers 2001). All homeopathic 
remedies are chosen on the basis of their ability to mimic symptoms and psychological 
states. So they should all be capable in principle of facilitating the transformation of beta 
into alpha elements along the lines described above. Untransformed of course it is, in 
Bion’s view, these beta elements that give rise to the psychosomatic, and borderline 
symptoms under discussion (Bion 1953, 1959).  
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It also seems relevant that remedies are dispensed on pills of milk sugar (lactose). The 
mother’s offering of breast milk in response to her infant’s cries of hunger is the early 
prototype of these processes of containment and transformation. So it is conceivable that 
taking the remedy triggers a body memory of these early experiences, and this too 
contributes to its therapeutic effect. Whatever the truth of these speculations, it seems 
clear that homeopathy is capable of evoking powerful psychological forces that need not 





This however gives rise to a potentially embarrassing question for analysts. Like 
Whitmont I have noticed that homeopathy can quite often relieve symptoms more quickly 
than analysis. My homeopathic case above illustrates as much. But how can this be, if 
homeopathy itself is acting largely or wholly psychologically? Part of the answer to this 
question will be apparent from the preceding discussion. But I believe that further 
consideration of Whitmont’s case reveals there may be an additional factor at work.  
 
 
It seems likely from his account, that one thing that held up his patient’s analysis was her 
fear of re-experiencing unbearable feelings of worthlessness in the transference. I have 
already pointed out above how the change from analyst to homeopath could have re-
activated those feelings. Paradoxically however, they could have simultaneously been 
diminished by the administration of the remedy, because any therapeutic change could 
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now be attributed to that remedy rather than the analyst. In this way, uncontained 
feelings of envy towards him, which were blocking the analysis, could have been 
bypassed.  
 
 The work of Herbert Rosenfeld (1987) linking analytic impasse to envy is of special 
relevance here. He points out that at times in a conventional analysis it may feel more 
bearable to remain stuck than allow the analyst to promote therapeutic change. That way 
the unbearable envy of the analyst’s apparent creativity in contrast to the patient’s 
apparent emptiness is avoided. It should now be possible to understand why homeopathy 
may in practice permit symptomatic relief in certain cases of analytic impasse.  
 
There are however potential dangers as well as benefits in this amalgamation of 
homeopathic and analytic practices. I will be in a better position to discuss these when I 




The differences between analysis and homeopathy can easily become obscured in a case 
such as Whitmont’s where the two have already been amalgamated. I think it is fair to 
say however that homeopathic patients are far more likely to present with physical or 
mixed emotional/physical symptoms than analytic ones. Where they do present 
emotionally as in my homeopathic case above, they tend to do so in a way that avoids not 
just envy but any regressive emotional involvement with the therapist. My patient for 
 12
instance was typical in that she reported crying after taking her staphis agria but did not 
cry in a session with me.   
 
People who choose homeopathy may therefore self -select partly on the basis of a wish to 
avoid dependent relationships. They depend instead on their remedy, which thus acts like 
a transitional object (Winnicott 1951). Practitioners who choose homeopathy likewise 
may prefer to avoid the perceived dangers of close relationships. Appointments for 
instance occur typically only monthly. 1 
 
I have also often noticed alarm in homeopathic supervisees when signs of strong emotion 
emerge in a session. The typical reaction is to wish to refer the patient straight on to a 
psychotherapist. This apparent fear of strong emotions often seems to be reciprocated in 
the patient. Certainly from an analytic point of view, the patient who somatises often 
does so to avoid feeling painful emotions or thinking about their implications (See e.g. 
Taylor 1985 on alexithymia). A shared fear of emotion may then underlie both parties’ 
choice of homeopathy as a means of treatment.  
 
Homeopathic theory is philosophically idealistic however despite its therapeutic reliance 
on remedies and fear of strong feelings. Emotion, spirit and mind are conceived as at the 
centre of the person, with the body on the periphery (Kent 1911, Vithoulkas 1980). But 
paradoxically there is very little therapeutic attempt to work directly with these 
                                                          
1 See Duckworth and Stone in the present volume for a related discussion. 
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psychological elements. They are usually simply regarded as especially important factors 




All this contrasts strongly with analytic theory and practice. Despite its therapeutic 
emphasis on the mind for instance there are strong philosophically materialistic strands 
present in both Freudian and Jungian analysis. These are evident in Freud’s ‘Project 
towards a physiological psychology’ (1896) as well as post-Jungian conceptions of the 
archetypes as innate genetically determined biological structures (see e.g. Stevens in the 
present volume).  
 
Most significantly perhaps, whereas homeopaths and their patients appear to defend 
against regression and emotional relating, analysts and theirs appear to defend against the 
body and physical relating. Thus there is a taboo on touch, and analytic theory places the 
somatic in the most inaccessible pre-symbolic (psychoid) part of the person. In part this 
is no more than common sense. Who for instance would expect to effectively treat a sore 
throat with psychotherapy? The successful homeopathic treatment of such a sore throat 
with a high potency remedy of course brings even this common sense into question. So 
does the operation of the placebo effect (see e.g. Peters 2001). But even leaving these 
instances aside, there are good reasons to suppose that the positioning of the body as 
taboo in psychotherapy is also partly defensive in origin. 
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In contrast to homeopaths, analysts and their patients seem to share a yearning for an 
intimate dependant relationship (see Duckworth and Stone in the present volume). The 
price of that intimacy however seems to be the exclusion of the body from the analytic 
relationship. Presumably in this way some of the dangers of both sexual acting out and 
‘malignant regression’ (Bateman and Holmes 1995:162) are reduced. It was these 
dangers that in part led Freud to abandon the massage technique that accompanied the 
treatment of his early analytic cases (see Jones1961). They also led to Breuer’s famous 
difficulties with Anna O and his eventual abandonment of psychoanalysis (ibid.). My 
first case above indicates an additional reason for what could be called this analytic 
‘demonisation of the body’ however. It has to do with dissociation as a defense against 
trauma. 
 
That patient, it will be recalled, retreated to an imaginary safe place when she 
experienced her environment as unbearably traumatic. She did this by dissociating from 
her body. As she flashed back to the original trauma, it was in her body that she first re-
experienced it. The body thus became the site of ‘demonic’ experience as well as a 
potential source of healing from it. That duality can be seen in a dream of hers in which 
some unidentified people were trying to give her a baby with a squirrel’s head. The 
dream image seems to have depicted the reunion of mind (squirrel- representing the 
imaginary safe place) with body (represented by the baby). This dream occurred after she 
had relived a particularly traumatic piece of abuse, and it indicates her horror at having to 
face the monstrous consequences of that abuse emotionally, in order to heal from it. 
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Myths such as that of Theseus and the Minotaur seem to depict the same journey of the 
soul back from a state of dissociation to one of wholeness through facing the terror of the 
original trauma. The patient’s ego here is in the place of the hero Theseus. The analyst 
like Ariadne holds the thread of words that helps him negotiate the labyrinth. The 
demonic Minotaur hidden at its heart is half bull, half man- the product of Queen 
Pasiphae’s intercourse with a white bull (Graves, 1955). This bull seems to represent 
those unacceptable human desires (including incestuous wishes) that must be sacrificed 
in order to live in society, as well as the events that occur when they are not. The 
labyrinth itself could be regarded in part as an expression of a confusional defense 
thrown up to hide that (real or imagined) incest and its consequences: but also as a 
healthy response to the decision to attempt to overcome the defensive split between mind 
and body by confronting the trauma. It (the labyrinth) may thus serve to reduce the risk 
of breakdown by regulating the amount of reality to which consciousness is exposed. 
 
Naturally the trauma at the heart of the labyrinth need not always be incest. In the 
precocious split of mind from body identified by Winnicott (1949) as the precursor of the 
false self, that trauma may have been the experience of disruptions to the state of ‘going 
on being’ in early infancy. While in certain schizoid individuals (see e.g. Guntrip 1968 p. 
35) the very existence of appetites in the here and now may be experienced as traumatic. 
In all these cases however where a person identifies with a ‘head ego’, it tends to be the 
body that is feared as the apparent site of trauma. And this may contribute to attracting 
people to analysis, as a therapy that shares this phobia of the body and identification with 
the mind. It is hardly surprising under these circumstances if that fear at times overcomes 
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the psyche-soma’s drive towards reintegration, and analytic work becomes stuck. A final 
consideration of the wisdom of Whitmont’s project should now be possible. 
 
Return to Whitmont’s project 
  
In the admittedly oversimplified account above, the analytic journey could be described 
as centripetal. That is, it is a movement of consciousness towards a confrontation with 
psyche-somatic reality. This contrasts with the centrifugal homeopathic journey 
described by Whitmont.2 There a remedy is given to liberate parts of the ego from the 
bodily drives (body psychoid) with which they have become merged. From the analytic 
point of view therefore, there is a danger that the symptomatic relief afforded by 
homeopathy may be achieved at the expense of consciously working material through. 
When my homeopathic patient cried after taking her staphis agria, for instance, she did so 
without consciously knowing what she was crying about. Arguably though, the patient 
may feel this loss of consciousness is a price worth paying if it helps overcome genuine 
intractable analytic impasse, and affords some symptom relief. 
 
Many apparent cases of impasse however may actually be surmountable analytically. 
Fordham (1957), Rosenfeld (1987), Bollas (1987) and others have all attempted to find 
ways of dealing with previously unanalysable material. They generally involve the 
analyst working closely on feelings engendered within the therapeutic relationship. But if 
even these methods fail, I do not personally see any reason for objecting to the use of 
homeopathy or other therapies to complement analytic work along the lines suggested by 
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Whitmont. In some ways the situation would then be similar to working analytically with 
patients on psychotropic medication, even though these act more chemically.  
 
It should be noted however, that even psychiatrically trained analysts do not tend to 
medicate their own patients. I believe there are many good reasons for this, which apply 
equally to complementary therapy. The increased danger of malignant regression and 
sexual acting out when analysts work physically with their patients has already been 
touched on. And working homeopathically usually does involve examining patients, 
enquiring after their physical symptoms and giving them physical remedies- even if these 
act mainly psychologically. Such physical involvement could make the regressive pull, 
already strong in many analytic relationships, overwhelming. The potential for analytic 
abuse of power and the adoption of a kind of therapeutic omnipotence would thus be 
increased, as would the risk of breakdown in the patient. For these reasons I believe there 
are dangers in analysts treating their own patients with complementary medicine, which 
generally outweigh the potential therapeutic benefits.  
 
 Impasse in complementary therapy 
 
On the other hand there are certain cases of what could be termed ‘complementary 
impasse’ that seem to stem from the emergence of problematic emotional material in the 
complementary therapy relationship. This can often be resolved through the application 
of relatively simple analytic insight. The centripetal nature of the homeopathic journey 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 This formulation also seems to accord with Erich Neumann’s  (1955) notion of ‘centroversion’. 
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lessens the risk of regression in such cases, although it can occur if the therapeutic 
relationship starts to evolve into a primarily psychotherapeutic one. For this reason it is 
generally preferable for the complementary therapist to refer the patient on to a colleague 
before this happens, even if he or she is analytically qualified. Presumably it is the fear of 





In this paper I have considered Edward Whitmont's proposal that analysts make use of 
homeopathy or other forms of complementary therapy in cases that seem intractable to 
ordinary analytic methods. I have concluded firstly that many such cases may not in fact 
be as intractable as they appear. Secondly that analysis itself can help make sense of both 
the action of homeopathic remedies and the effects of the therapeutic dynamics in many 
homeopathic (and other complementary therapy) cases. To that extent I have questioned 
Whitmont's formulation of homeopathy, which relies on a scientifically unsubstantiated 
appeal to ‘subtle body fields’. Despite these reservations however I have argued that 
there is nothing intrinsically problematic in Whitmont's proposals, provided the analyst 
does not conduct both the analysis and the complementary treatment himself. In such 
cases the dangers of acting out, serious regression or even breakdown are in my opinion 
usually too great to justify the potential therapeutic benefits. I have gone on to point out 
some other possibilities for cooperation between analysis and complementary therapy 
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particularly in the use of basic analytic insight to help resolve certain cases of 
'complementary impasse'. 
 
Finally there are one or two loose ends I would like to attempt to tie up. I am aware that 
the presentation of my homeopathic vignettes at the start of this paper left some 
unanswered questions. Do I really believe that it might be possible to explain these cases, 
and especially the child’s recovery from cerebral palsy, psychologically? And why did I 
feel uneasy when my homeopathic patient felt better? 
 
I am not sure I can fully answer either of these questions. Part of my unease was no doubt 
due to the apparently magical nature of my homeopathic intervention; but also, I suspect, 
to the unequivocally positive transference I received. Did this mean that somebody else, 
the boy’s father for instance, had to receive an equally strong negative transference? The 
answer to the other question I will have to leave open.  I do recall however that the boy’s 
mother was receiving counselling (with someone else) at the same time as I treated her 
son homeopathically for his cerebral palsy. And I often wonder what role, if any, that 
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